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Abstract
 This paper focuses on the recent efforts initiated by Japan to coordinate between 
the economic assistance and military operations in war-driven countries such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The paper proposes that there are both tangible and non-tangible indicators 
of “vulnerabilities” in conflict risk, which can be modeled and measured using a “censored” 
econometric model called the “Tobit.” According to the results of the Tobit model, the 
size of official development assistance （ODA） is significantly negatively correlated with 
the tangible and intangible risks of war, suggesting the existence of circular causality 
between increased ODA and decreased risk. An important policy implication can be 
drawn from the analysis. In a war or war-like situation, such as the case of Iraq since 2003, 
only armed personnel can break the “vicious cycle of deteriorating security,” to balance 
the need for development and accessibility to the needy areas. In an extremely risky case 
of a “non-permissive” environment, that is, when the security level is significantly low, it 
may also be that civilians cannot perform their duties even when they are protected by the 
military. In order to break such dilemma, which may arise during peacebuilding in non-
permissive situations, and to realize the effectiveness of peacebuilding in these countries, 
more substantive coordination between ODA and military agencies is required. The 
Japan Self-Defense Forces （SDF） are directly involved in humanitarian operations in 
East Timor and Iraq as engineers and social workers, roles that can be considered as the 
de facto equivalent of providing development assistance, such as reconstruction of basic 
and lifeline infrastructure. The regression analysis provides some additional evidence for 
cases in which the armed forces are expected to conduct development and reconstruction 
operations under risky situations, pointing to a new norm of development assistance that 
promotes peacebuilding.
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１．Introduction
 A significant amount of money has been spent as Official Development 
Assistance （ODA） by Japan since 1954. Intended as war reparations to 
Southeast Asian countries victimized by Japan during the Second World War, 
the officially announced objectives of ODA tend to include international 
development issues, the topics for which vary according to specific needs and 
time. By the end of the 1990s, Japan had become the largest contributor of 
ODA in the world. After 9/11, major countries doubled and tripled military 
and non-military assistance to countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, with Japan 
currently ranking as the fourth or fifth highest contributor. In 2003, the ODA 
Charter, the most influential policy guidance adopted by the Cabinet, was 
drastically revised to ensure that “peacebuilding” becomes and remains one of 
the central missions of ODA, alongside poverty reduction, sustained growth, 
and global issues. Since then, Japan has committed assistance more explicitly 
to international peace operations through projects in countries like Iraq and 
Afghanistan.１ 
 In 2005, the ODA Mid-Term Policy issued operational guidelines. It 
defines peacebuilding as a process “to prevent the occurrence and recurrence 
of conflicts, alleviate the various difficulties that people face during and im-
mediately after conflicts, and subsequently achieve long-term stable develop-
ment” and underlines the importance of “human security.” In 2008, the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency （JICA） became the sole implementing 
body for Japanese ODA under the leadership of Madame Sadako Ogata, the 
former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees （UNHCR）, who 
cochaired the United Nations Human Security Commission with Professor 
Amartya Sen. Peacebuilding programs were centered among the four policy 
directives of “reconstruction of social capital,” “reconstruction of the econ-
omy,” “recovery of governance,” and “assurance of security.” Madam Ogata 
broadened the concept of peacebuilding to include various forms of humani-
tarian assistance for developing countries under the title of “human security.” 
Since then, peacebuilding has also been concerned with “political and security 
mechanisms to address conflicts.”２
 The current ODA Charter is under revision and a new version will 
be issued by the year 2015 after undergoing public consultation. In order to 
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ensure that the new charter is easy to implement and realistic, it is important 
to take stock of and draw lessons from past experience. The central ques-
tion in this case is very similar to one asked for public policy evaluation: 
To what extent has the policy achieved its intended objectives, in this case, 
peacebuilding?
 In order to address this question, it is important to understand that 
Japanese assistance for peacebuilding consists of two policy streams. The 
first is an economic and humanitarian stream of ODA, running from the 
ODA Charter to the Mid-Term Policy, and extending to focal points for 
International Cooperation, the Country Assistance Program, and the Rolling 
Plan. The second is the military or paramilitary stream of peacekeeping 
operations （PKO）, spanning the PKO Law, Implementation Order, and 
Implementation Plan. The Japan Self-Defense Forces （SDF） serve as the 
main implementing body for the second stream. With the exception of 
Sakaemura （2013）, however, little is known about the SDF’s contributions 
toward reconstruction in postwar countries.３ This paper tries shed light on 
the SDF’s recent efforts to coordinate between economic assistance and mili-
tary or paramilitary operations. The noteworthy research by Collier （2004） 
and Collier et al. （2003） has contributed to “mainstreaming” the subject for 
both academic and practical circles of development, but there is virtually no 
contribution treating assistance from Japan as rigorously in the economics 
literature.
 This paper first provides an overview of Japanese ODA operations in 
peacebuilding. Then, it proposes that “vulnerabilities” in conflict risk poses 
pose tangible and non-tangible effects, which can be modeled and measured 
using a “censored” econometric model called the “Tobit” model. The paper 
concludes by providing policy implications based on the results of the analysis.
２．Japan’s Peacebuilding Operations: Some Background４
 It is not straightforward to define a list of recipients of peacebuilding 
assistance from Japan, and there are nuanced differences among researches 
about the definition of peacebuilding itself. The Japanese government has 
pursued “human security” as the central theme of peacebuilding. Thus, ef-
forts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity （poverty）, 
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environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, infec-
tious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees, and anti-personnel 
land mines are listed as peacebuilding efforts through ODA. This study uses 
information from the web site of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs （MOFA） 
and identifies 26 countries５ that have received ODA from Japan in terms of 
“peacebuilding” or “consolidation of peace.” Two immediate observations 
can be made. First, a large portion of ODA was assigned to infrastructure 
projects in the listed countries that received considerable ODA （Iraq, Sri 
Lanka, etc.）. The purpose of this infrastructure building, most of which was 
assisted via yen loans, is not limited to “peacebuilding in a narrower sense” but 
looks forward to the long-term building of the countries in a broader sense. 
Second, in most countries, the conflict-affected area makes up only a part of 
the country’s territory. Examples include Aceh in Indonesia, Mindanao in the 
Philippines, and the northeastern area of Sri Lanka. Therefore, only a part 
of the ODA to these countries can be included in the amount of ODA for 
peacebuilding, and this is not the case for most of the countries that receive 
ODA from Japan. 
  The official data show that the amount of ODA for peacebuilding in 
the target countries has rapidly expanded, especially after 2006. The aver-
age amount for 1999-2005 was 789 million yen, and that for 2006-2009 was 
5,283 million yen （6.7 times higher than the former period）. Among the 
six areas of assistance, “demining” has been the priority area for the last 10 
years, with Cambodia as the largest recipient. ODA for “security system man-
agement and reform” expanded after 2005, with the largest recipient being 
Afghanistan. 
 However, the magnitude or effectiveness of assistance is not always 
captured in the costs of capital investments. One noteworthy example is 
the so-called “Security System Management and Reform” （SSR）, which 
is recognized as a newly emerging important agenda point in recent years. 
Traditionally, Japan did not extend ODA assistance to SSR, but this has 
changed since 2006. One of the new features of Japan’s aid to SSR is the 
budgetary support provided for the salaries of the Afghanistan National 
Police （ANP） after 2008. Before that, Japan had taken a negative stance 
against budgetary support for operational costs, because it regarded the 
same as unsustainable and temporary. However, security is the key factor for 
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peacebuilding in Afghanistan, and the significance of assisting the capacity 
enhancement of the ANP was taken into consideration.
  Another notable area is the “Grant Aid for Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding,” an aid scheme introduced in 2002. This grant aid scheme 
intends to assist conflict prevention and peacebuilding programs in conflict-
affected countries and includes disposal of small arms; Demobilization, 
Disarmament, and Reintegration （DDR）; demining of landmines and 
Unexploded Ordinances （UXOs）; national reconciliation; etc. Afghanistan 
was the recipient of 47.2％ of the total amount of this grant aid in 2002-2008. 
  Despite these new efforts, however, Japan continues to hold a compara-
tive advantage in assistance to capital investments. In particular, JICA has 
been heavily supporting infrastructure development in the transportation, 
telecommunication, and energy sectors in post-conflict countries. However, it 
is not easy to measure whether and to what extent the comparative advantage 
has been fully utilized. In Sri Lanka, a large amount of aid money has been al-
located to infrastructure development, such as roads, because a large portion of 
assistance has been provided in the form of loans with low interest rates. For 
other target countries, however, the aid amount allocated for infrastructure 
development is less. For example, the Japanese contribution to infrastructure 
development in Afghanistan is only about 1/450th of all ODA projects from 
Japan. The corresponding number is 1/13 in Iraq and less than half of that in 
Timor-Leste and Sudan. As Iraq is eligible for a loan, which is a standard tool 
to finance capital investments, it is surprising why the amount allocated for 
infrastructure development is so low. In reality, more ODA has been allocated 
to non-infrastructure areas.
 Overall, as of 2009, the ratio of ODA amount allocated for infrastruc-
ture and non-infrastructure is 2:55 （million USD） for Japan, contrasting with 
900:1500 （million USD） or about 3:5 for the US. This implies that the ratio 
of infrastructure ODA is higher in relative terms for the US than Japan. In 
other countries, Japanese ODA is disbursed in the ratio of 2.4:3.3 （million 
USD） or about 8:11, contrasting with 8.9:12.2 （million USD） or about 3:4. 
These numbers underscore the relatively higher ratio of infrastructure ODA 
from Japan. The same conclusion can be drawn from the data for Iraq and Sri 
Lanka, while the opposite is true for the data from Sudan and the People’s 
Republic of the Congo.
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３．Measuring Vulnerabilities to Conflict Risk
 A country that faces risks of conflict or social unrest within and across 
its national boundaries usually expects to receive foreign assistance in any 
form—economic or military—as long as such assistance is effective toward 
reducing such risks. The World Bank （2011） concludes that the volatility 
of foreign aid has exacerbated the stability of these “fragile” countries. This 
paper subscribes to this view, but it goes beyond “fragility,” which is concep-
tually vague, and it actually focuses on a more explicit and tangible measure 
of fragility. We define this measure as “vulnerability to conflict risk,” which 
could serve as an evaluative tool for peacebuilding. The risk in this study refers 
to the “vulnerabilities against risks of war,” namely to what extent a country 
could resist the occurrence of a conflict-like situation. There is a technical dif-
ficulty in identifying cause and effect factors; providing assistance to high-risk 
countries is a sign of having targeted the needy countries correctly. On the 
other hand, reduction of risk itself is a policy goal and an outcome indicator; 
hence, using the same argument, it is expected that the risk is low for assisted 
countries. 
 The “vulnerability” defined in this paper is broad and comprehensive 
enough to include a “non-tangible” case or a social situation in which the 
probability of conflict is “potentially” high. It does not matter whether an 
actual conflict has visibly occurred, because any small factors could trigger an 
actual conflict at any time, and the resulting violence may spiral beyond the 
threshold. This is consistent with informal observations in risky countries; a 
violent conflict could occur at any time when the barometer of vulnerabilities 
reaches a certain level. Even if the barometer remains lower than the threshold 
level, it is still possible that other forms of expression, from terrorism to street 
demonstrations, can erupt, because certain levels of vulnerabilities still remain 
high. 
 Collier and Hoeffler （2004）, the architects of the branch of econom-
ics of conflicts, suggest the usage of the “State Fragility Index” （SFI）, a 
time series dataset issued by the Center for Global Policy at George Mason 
University. At the end of the survey year, the SFI scores each country on both 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy across four performance dimensions: Security, 
Political, Economic, and Social. Each indicator is rated on a four-point 
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fragility scale: 0, indicating “no fragility;” 1, “low fragility;” 2, “medium fragil-
ity;” and 3, “high fragility.” The Economic Effectiveness indicator is the only 
indicator to be rated on a five-point fragility scale, wherein 4 denotes “extreme 
fragility.” The SFI then combines the scores of the eight indicators, which 
range from 0 （“no fragility”） to 25 （“extreme fragility”）.６
 The following countries have high SFI scores as of 2009. The more re-
cent SFI７ list, which was just released at the time of writing this paper, shows 
that the major rankings remain more or less the same.
Table 1　High SFI Countries （as of 2009）
SFI Eﬀectiveness Legitimacy
Somalia 25 13 12
Congo dr 23 12 11
Sudan 23 11 12
Afghanistan 22 12 10
Chad 22 12 10
Ethiopia 21 11 10
Myanmar 21 11 10
Iraq 20 10 10
Sierra Leone 19 11 8
Burundi 18 12 6
Central Africa Rep. 18 10 8
Liberia 18 11 7
Niger 18 9 9
Nigeria 18 9 9
Rwanda 18 10 8
　　 Source: Global Report 2009
Table 2　SFI and Risks of Conflicts （1996-2007）
SFI Total Periods of Conflicts Probabilities（%）
0～ 3 2 0.38
4 ～ 7 7 2.27
8 ～ 11 42 9.46
12 ～ 15 90 20.3
16 ～ 19 64 19.3
20 ～ 25 127 66.1
Source: Global Report 2009
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 It is well known that there is a significant correlation among the SFI, 
probability of conflict occurrence, and duration of conflicts. In particular, an 
SFI score exceeding 20 （very fragile） indicates a total conflict duration of 
about 125 years with more than 60％ probability for that particular country.
 As a starting point for the policy analysis, we refer to the quantitative 
data, by classifying the amounts of foreign aid received by countries in terms 
of their SFIs.
 Table 3 shows that only 10％ of Japanese ODA （half the OECD/DAC８ 
member average） was allocated to countries with an SFI of 20 or higher, 
whereas roughly half the ODA was allocated to countries with mid-ranging 
SFI （6-20）. This suggests that Japanese ODA tends to concentrate on coun-
tries having mid-to-high level of fragility （e.g., Cambodia and Timor-Leste） 
rather than extremely vulnerable countries （e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, Congo 
DR, and Sierra Leone）. Another reason for these findings lies in the high 
share of Japanese ODA loans, which tend to avoid risks in terms of economic 
returns and debt sustainability.
４．More on the Descriptive Statistics
 Further descriptive analysis is conducted using international databanks 
for 1980-2009. In addition to the overall analysis, the following countries are 
recognized as specially targeted countries in that Japan made significant ODA 
contributions to them. They include Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Sri 
Lanka, Chad, East Timor, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone.  
Table 3　Per Capita ODA by SFI（96-2009）
SFI Japan DAC Average
0- 5 6% 9%
6-10 30% 22%
11-15 30% 26%
16-20 25% 24%
20-25 10% 20%
Source: Global Report 2009
*DAC refers to the Development Assistance Committee.
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（1） ODA and Vulnerability Indices 
 Table A1 （SFI） in the Appendix shows that overall per capita ODA 
received is lower than 10 USD for lower SFI （0-3） countries and 20-30 USD 
for countries with SFI ranging from 4-20. A huge gap exists for high SFI （ex-
ceeding 20） countries, from less than 10 USD to nearly 40 USD. Specifically, 
Afghanistan recorded the highest ODA across the entire observation period, 
with an SFI of 21-25. The ODA received by Afghanistan peaks at an SFI 
of 21 and declines thereafter. Angola （an oil-rich country） shows negative 
ODA around an SFI of 19, indicating the repayment of international debt. 
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Nepal record SFI values of 12-17, which are gener-
ally lower than those of Afghanistan, Angola, Iraq, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
（20 or over）, and these countries received ODA of 10-20 USD, which is very 
close to the average. East Timor is an extraordinary recipient of assistance, 
recording ODA of 150-190 USD per capita, while Pakistan only receives less 
than 5 USD. Other big recipients include Iraq （nearly 800 USD with an SFI 
of 22 in 2005）. Liberia and Sierra Leone show higher SFIs, but the average 
size of the assistance they received nearly equals that of Angola’s.
 Panel （a） of Table A2 （Seriousness of Conflict, variable name: actotal） 
indicates that many countries do not have conflict, and the amounts of ODA 
received exceed those where actotal is 0 or 1. East Timor received massive 
“postwar” assistance, namely 174.4 USD per capita of ODA received for 
zero conflict. This contrasts sharply with Iraq, which received 281.7 USD 
with an actotal as high as 6 （de facto “in-war” assistance）. Panel （b） of Table 
A2 （Assassinations, variable name: domestic1） shows that countries with 
lower number of assassinations receive higher ODA, with the exception of 
East Timor and Iraq, where the number of assassinations exceeded one, and 
they received higher ODA. Panel （c） of Table A2 （Strikes, variable name: 
domestic2） shows that most countries recorded zero strikes, and no systematic 
relationship is observed with the size of the ODA. Panel （d） of Table A2 
（Guerrilla Activities, variable name: domestic3） shows that Iraq recorded the 
highest number of guerrilla activities, while other recipient countries show a 
low score of 1. Again, no systematic relationship is observed with the size of 
the ODA.
 Panel （e） of Table A2 （Government Crises, variable name: domestic4） 
and Panel （f） of Table A2 （Purges, variable name: domestic5） provide no 
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significant features, except that East Timor and Iraq recorded the highest 
ODA received. Panel （g） of Table A2 （Riots, variable name: domestic6） shows 
variations among countries; the occurrence of riots was relatively high in 
South Asia （Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Pakistan） although the relationship with 
the size of ODA received remains unclear. Panel （h） of Table A2 （Revolution, 
variable name: domestic7） also shows country variations with no regional ten-
dencies. Finally, Panel （i） of Table A2 （Antigovernment Demonstrations, 
variable name: domestic8） includes a wide range of scores, from 0 to 26, show-
ing negative tendencies with the amounts of ODA received. The occurrence 
of antigovernment demonstrations was high in Nepal and Pakistan.
（2） UNPKO Activities and ODA 
 In war-driven countries, ODA is expected to generate higher impacts 
when it is effectively combined with other economic and non-economic ef-
forts, including the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations （hereinafter 
referred to as UNPKO or PKO）. If countries with PKO activities receive 
ODA, they are listed and analyzed using the same data source. We summarize 
the description of the data below.
  actotal: The amount of ODA received is higher for countries–periods 
with PKO. On the other hand, countries with no PKO receive less ODA.
   SFI: It presents the same tendency as actotal, but the higher the SFI, the 
larger the size of ODA. Countries with low SFI have no record of PKO.
   domestic1 to domestic8: For countries–periods with zero scores for these 
variables, PKO increases with ODA. Abundant PKO are observed for coun-
tries–periods with zero scores.
５．Tobit Model and Results
 As mentioned in Section 1, very few studies quantitatively evaluate the 
achievement of peacebuilding policies through ODA or PKO, given the vari-
ous complex and often intangible influences over the causality of ODA. In 
general, people tend to express their emotions or become violent when society 
cannot satisfy or suppress them enough. In other words, the occurrence of 
emotional or violent expressions in terms of riots or demonstrations indicate 
that their vulnerabilities are higher than the threshold. The lack of expression, 
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however, does not mean that society is not vulnerable; rather it means that the 
norms of that society have succeeded in making its people unexpressive. What 
is the best way to evaluate such behavior?
 One way is to use the so-called Tobit （1958） model, which refers to 
censored regression models. Suppose that y* is the true solution to the conflict 
risk minimization equation, which is also influenced by variables denoted as 
x. The x variables both “push” and “pull” factors of risk. The pull factors may 
include ODA, PKO, institutions, education, and infrastructure, while the push 
factors may include regional characteristics, ethnicity, and natural resources. 
The standard Tobit model９ is defined by
∗ = ′ +     = 1,2, … ,
= ∗    ∗ >
= 0    ∗
  …… eq. （1）
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　  …… eq. （2）
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　  …… eq. （3）
where {ui} are assumed to be i.i.d., drawing from N（0, σ2）. It is assumed 
that {yi} and {xi} are observed for = 1,2, … , , but { ∗} are unobserved if 
∗ . Thus, y* is a latent variable of “risk,” which is visible only if it exceeds 
a certain threshold of c. If it is below that level, it remains invisible.  
 When the constant c is assumed to be zero without loss of generality, 
the likelihood function of the above model is given by
L = ∏ [1 ( ′ ⁄ )]∏ −1 [ ′ ⁄ ]10     …… eq. （4）
where ϕ and φ are the distribution and density functions of the standard nor-
mal variable, respectively. However, we observe no { ∗} if ∗ , and thus, 
the above model can be rewritten as
L = ∏ [ ( ′ ⁄ )−1] −1 [ ( ′ )⁄ ]1 ? ?  …… eq. （5）
 The expected value of the latent variable ∗ is
E[ ∗] = ′  …… eq. （6）
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Therefore, the marginal effect of the change in xs equals the βs, which means 
that the reported regression coefficients can be interpreted similarly as in the 
standard linear regression models.
 The dependent variables are the same as before （actotal, domestic1 to do-
mestic8 , and SFI）, and the standard ordinary least squares （OLS） regression 
is run for the SFI, as data on fragility are available for the entire sample space.
 The independent variables include income （natural logarithm of gross 
domestic product or GDP）, infrastructure （％ of paved roads）, education （lit-
eracy）, trade （dependence of net exports over GDP）, qualitative and dummy 
variables of Africa, and scores for effectiveness of the legislature. The ODA 
data are per capita USD received in the same year and/or the preceding year. 
PKO （dummy） is recorded as 1 if the nation had PKO in that year and is 0 
otherwise.
 The following table describes a case in which the dependent variable is 
actotal （Seriousness of Conflict）.
 Traffic, trade, and education are significantly negatively correlated, sug-
gesting that physical and social infrastructure contribute positively to reducing 
the risks of conflict. Politics is counterintuitive, which could be a sign that po-
litical stability is not a push factor for peace. Another counterintuitive result is 
Table 4　Tobit Regression
Indep Var Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat
gdppc 0.000 -0.77 0.000 -0.74 0.000 -0.48 0.000 -0.70 
traﬃc -0.001 -6.63 *** -0.001 -6.50 *** -0.001 -5.70 *** -0.001 -5.72 ***
trade -0.446 -3.47 *** -0.468 -3.48 *** -0.634 -4.74 *** -0.709 -5.09 ***
education -0.015 -1.54 -0.015 -1.47 -0.026 -2.54 ** -0.060 -4.36 ***
politics 0.859 6.19 *** 0.914 6.41 *** 0.965 6.61 *** 1.024 6.89 ***
odapc -0.055 -8.38 ***
odapcllag -0.054 -8.10 ***
odajpc -0.161 -4.66 ***
odajpcllag -0.189 -4.98 ***
unpko 4.517 8.05 *** 4.382 7.77 *** 3.979 6.69 *** 3.740 6.24 ***
africa -2.165 -7.63 *** -2.176 -7.45 *** -2.883 -9.70 *** -2.678 -8.68 ***
N（censored） 2490 1717 2391 1650 2410 1680 2311 1610
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.084 0.075 
Stars ＊＊ and ＊＊＊ denote statistical significance at the 5％ and 1％ levels, respectively.
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that of the Africa dummy, as it contradicts the common observation.
 ODA per capita in the same year and preceding year are significantly 
negative regardless of country of origin （i.e., Japan – variable odajpc or oda-
jpc1lag, or all total – variable odapc or odapc1lag）, which signifies that ODA 
actually contributes to lowering the risks.
 UNPKO is significantly positive, which is interesting. This could mean 
that the PKO activities （many of which are conducted by non-civilian per-
sonnel） are well targeted； that is, more PKO are correctly assigned to more 
vulnerable countries. Though the result does not provide any straightforward 
causal implications about the involvement of armed forces in the process of 
peacebuilding, the inclusion of the variable PKO is statistically significant for 
overall explanatory power. More qualitative and case-by-case examinations are 
required to evaluate the role of nontraditional actors, especially armed forces, 
as mentioned in Section 5.
 Other results of the regression models are reported in the Appendix and 
are summarized in Table 5.
 To sum up, this result points to two primary policy implications. 
First, the ODA amount is significantly negatively correlated with risks of 
war, suggesting the existence of circular causality between increasing ODA 
and decreasing risks. The same result holds for Japanese ODA, both with 
and without time lag, and for the DAC member average. The sizes of the 
Table 5　Summary Results of the Tobit Regressions
Y variable
X variable
Seriousness 
of War
Guerrilla 
Activities Riots SFI
Income － －
Road － － － －
Education （weak）
Trade － － －
Africa （dummy） － － － ＋
Politics ＋ ＋ ＋
ODA（Japan） － － － －
ODA（World） － － － －
　　 See the Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix for details.
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coefficients are generally larger for Japanese ODA than for the DAC average. 
In a similar context, per capita income and infrastructure are negatively cor-
related with the y variables. However, education is not significant.
 Second, the dummy for Africa shows positive significance only for SFI, 
and it is negative for other variables, suggesting that while Africa is vulner-
able, the risks there rarely escalate to actual violence. Institution （Effectiveness 
of Legislature） is positive, suggesting that stable democracies can also allow 
for the visible antigovernment actions.
６．Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks 
  By measuring vulnerability, the paper has clarified some “non-tangible” 
factors and contributors to peacebuilding. The analysis may provide additional 
evidence for cases with nontraditional agents of ODA, such as the armed 
forces, which are expected to complement and/or fulfill development man-
dates and reconstruction operations under risky situations. Thus, the findings 
of this paper point to a new norm of development assistance via peacebuild-
ing. However, general policy implications must be drawn with caution as the 
effectiveness could vary with cases.  
 Historically, Japan has dispatched non-civilian personnel for PKO to 
countries such as Cambodia, East Timor, and Haiti, and in some of these 
cases, the Japanese government has later provided large amounts of ODA to 
these countries. For instance, after sending its SDF to Cambodia for PKO, 
Japan made a comprehensive contribution to peacebuilding in the country 
by offering a large amount of ODA. It remains unclear if and to what extent 
such non-civilian operations will be successful without ODA. The SDF gifted 
its road construction/maintenance vehicles and equipment to the govern-
ment of East Timor after completing its part in the PKO mission in 2004. 
However, much of this equipment was not being used to capacity.10 Therefore, 
JICA is currently assisting East Timor by providing ODA and building its 
capacity towards the management of these vehicles and equipment alongside 
infrastructure development.
 Since then, considerable improvements have facilitated coordination be-
tween Japan’s ODA and its SDF operations, one example being the relatively 
unknown “successful” case in Iraq. Sakaemura （2013） provides convincing 
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evidence of SDF operations in Iraq, wherein they facilitated “the basis to cre-
ate necessary conditions for a sustainable peace.” The Iraqi case suggests that 
in less developed areas and in areas immediately affected by conflicts, it is 
critical to facilitate development implemented by civilians while maintaining 
security using armed forces. The analysis in this paper reveals an important 
policy implication. In a war or warlike situation, such as the case of Iraq since 
2003, only armed personnel can break the “vicious cycle of deteriorating secu-
rity,” to balance the need for development and accessibility to the needy areas. 
Further, in an extremely risky “non-permissive” environment, that is, when 
the security level is significantly low, it may be that civilians cannot perform 
their duties even when they are protected by the military. In order to achieve 
results in such environments, more substantive coordination between ODA 
and military agencies is required in order to realize the effectiveness of peace-
building operations in these countries.11 
 This policy implication is not new, though very few studies have treated it 
formally in economics.  The Iraqi case, for example, is considered largely contro-
versial because the current security situation remains precarious. The real success 
of peacebuilding could therefore be defined or measured in terms of “sustainabil-
ity” or “robustness of peace,” an area of study that may be explored in the future. 
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Appendix
Table A1  Comparison between ODA received and country SFI
Afghanistan Angola Cambodia SriLanka Chad
East
Timor Iraq Libaria Nepal Pakistan
Sierra
Leone
All 
Total
IFS
0 6.3485
11
1 5.0625
35
2 3.6349
20
3 9.425
30
4 22.3108
39
5 13.7515
56
6 25.0993
73
7 23.5118
80
8 21.6829
85
9 32.0945
95
10 23.8641
117
11 35.4504
110
12 5.6199 11.3882 31.8674
1 2 103
13 27.6135 20.9073 23.6072
3 2 91
14 25.5599 19.0423 162.0417 14.4095 23.8951
3 8 1 2 118
15 21.3217 13.6328 176.3294 10.2376 4.9153 28.6134
3 3 4 5 2 114
16 18.3566 197.0216 11.1573 4.1138 25.6163
3 1 6 7 101
17 6.6513 28.8916 156.4183 12.4831 4.2147 27.0579
3 2 1 2 4 90
18 8.9823 2.8573 23.0656
1 2 74
19 -2.712 81.5887 134.797 3.4929 25.8117
1 3 2 1 42
20 15.3175 110.7451 52.3694 47.0553 19.3287
1 6 1 2 31
21 98.1053 37.4085 14.3892 65.6002 44.6203 8.4934
1 3 3 5 2 30
22 79.7622 19.2934 13.006 784.6251 16.1976 32.604 18.5845
7 3 12 1 2 4 29
23 19.296 16.2067 27.5394 16.8183
4 5 2 18
24 6.1806 9.9955 19.0159 4.255
6 2 6 15
25 5.2052 37.6643
1 2
Note: Non-italic numbers indicate the amount of ODA per capita received in USD, while italic numbers indicate the number of 
observations for each category.
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Table A2 Comparisons of ODA received against Seriousness of Conflict and ODA received against variables 
domestic 1 to domestic 8
Afghanistan Angola Cambodia Sri Lanka Chad
East
Timor Iraq Libaria Nepal Pakistan
Sierra
Leone All Total
0 2.1 5.1 23.4 14.2 11.7 174.4 3.5 38.5 9.4 4.6 18.4 26.3
3 3 11 8 10 7 4 21 23 6 23 2,518
1 90.3 35.5 17.3 19.2 16.3 10.6 10.7 11.4 4.6 18.5 28.1
7 3 8 22 1 2 4 11 20 11 154
2 3.2 12.5 1.7 23.4 20.2 10.8 29.8 4.8 15.6
23 26 2 4 3 2 1 3 130
3 14.3 2.6 2.2 16.4 3.2 17.1 4.1 12.7
1 2 9 20 4 8 2 137
4 4.9 281.7 6.2 6.5
2 7 3 132
5 2.0 16.2
4 96
6 11.8 19.3
2 100
7 1.0 2.3
9 14
8 1.3
8
9 12.3
26
10 10.4
7
0 3.3 12.9 11.5 18.1 14.9 148.4 18.6 29.3 9.5 4.7 18.0 65.0 
21 35 32 23 32 7 27 32 31 23 35 3,788
1 46.8 22.1 18.5 16.8 6.6 29.4 12.6 4.8 21.6
8 3 6 3 3 3 4 6 208
2 48.0 17.0 192.2 312.3 4.4 22.6
4 5 1 1 4 64
3 57.9 19.4 3.6 11.4
2 1 1 32
4 2.3 15.3
1 17
5 0.0 2.5 12.8
0 1 10
6 162.3 21.8
1 9
7 9.9
10
8 784.6 10.0 
1 2
9 4.4
1
10 299.8 9.3
1 3
11 0.2
1
12 16
4
13 50.8
1
14 11.0 
1
15 10.4
2
16 5.0
1
17 11.4
1
0 22.1 13.3 12.4 18.2 15.2 153.9 59.5 29.3 9.3 4.7 18.5 64.4
34 34 35 31 34 8 35 35 24 26 33 3,847
1 1.6 15.3 11.2 10.6 4.6 9.7 20.9
1 3 1 9 7 1 206
2 0.7 13.5 3.5 9.9 11.8
1 1 2 1 58
3 23.7 14.5 20.0 
1 1 31
4 7.8
10
5 21.8
1
6 7.2
2
Str
ike
s（
Do
me
sti
c2
）
No
 of
 A
ssa
sin
ati
on
（
Do
me
sti
c1
）
Se
rio
usn
ess
 of
 C
on
flic
t（
act
ota
l）
21
Waseda Global Forum No. 11, 2014, 3－25
Table A2d-e-f-g
0 2.1 12.1 20.7 16.7 14.6 153.6 3.6 32.9 9.7 4.8 17.7 66.0 
3 11 12 10 25 7 18 28 33 32 30 3,701
1 20.4 13.7 8.1 18.3 14.0 156.4 74.7 14.9 12.5 2.9 19.8 21.5
28 23 23 24 8 1 12 7 2 3 5 400
2 43.4 4.0 26.7 25.2 84.3 10.2
4 1 1 2 4 37
3 8.6
17
4 784.6
1
0 20.3 12.9 12.5 17.7 15.2 147.1 11.8 32.9 8.9 4.9 18.2 63.3
25 35 30 30 34 6 28 26 24 22 34 3,782
1 29.1 11.7 21.6 11.2 174.3 161.7 13.1 11.9 4.0 12.4 40.0 
8 5 4 1 2 4 7 10 9 1 302
2 4.7 15.5 369.5 3.7 27.0 
2 1 3 3 58
3 11.7 5.6 40.5
1 1 11
4 39.1 2.0 
2 2
0 22.5 13.3 13.6 17.9 15.1 153.9 46.8 29.3 9.9 4.6 18.0 62.0 
31 34 28 34 35 8 27 33 35 34 35 4,062
1 16.9 8.4 22.7 3.8 17.2 18.1
3 6 1 5 1 73
2 3.0 1.1 267.3 43.4 4.3 8.4
1 1 3 1 1 13
3 3.3 6.0 
1 4
4 236.6
1
5 4.7
2
0 16.3 12.9 12.3 18.0 15.1 146.3 26.9 28.1 9.6 3.9 18.7 66.7
30 35 32 26 35 6 31 29 24 12 32 3,623
1 65.4 14.0 18.5 176.7 394.0 38.0 9.3 4.8 3.9 26.0 
4 3 4 2 2 5 7 8 1 294
2 -0.5 19.6 231.0 21.3 13.1 6.1 9.9 21.2
1 2 2 1 2 6 1 118
3 0.0 11.6 3.4 16.0 16.6
0 1 4 1 49
4 21.5 0.0 6.1 19.3
2 0 1 30
5 8.5 13.2 6.2 11.3
1 1 1 10
6 4.6 7.4
2 9
7 4.3 4.9
1 2
8 1.4
1
9 1.2
1
10 1.0 
1
11 11.4
5
12 3.8
2
13 4.3
1
14 0.8
3
15 0.9
1
1.9
（
Gu
err
ia 
Ac
tiv
itie
）
Go
v C
ris
is（
Do
me
sti
c4
）
Pu
rge
s（
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c5
）
（
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（
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Table A2h-i
0 2.1 13.7 16.3 16.1 13.4 147.1 2.2 35.8 9.3 4.7 16.1 67.7
3 14 16 11 14 6 16 20 28 32 23 3,469
1 23.8 13.0 7.2 19.2 16.1 174.3 104.4 18.3 12.3 3.8 24.3 28.4
25 20 17 23 19 2 13 11 7 2 9 582
2 21.3 1.1 14.5 23.6 136.1 27.2 3.3 13.4 20.1
7 1 1 1 5 4 1 3 87
3 11.2 11.7 8.1
1 1 14
4 26.2 3.5
2 2
0 8.7 12.9 12.0 17.9 15.1 153.6 16.1 27.7 8.4 4.0 18.5 68.7
28 35 33 25 33 7 30 31 20 11 31 3,368
1 83.2 19.1 14.8 156.4 331.1 41.6 13.3 6.0 15.0 37.3
5 7 2 1 1 3 4 5 2 380
2 -0.1 20.5 41.2 11.2 4.4 16.0 24.2
1 1 1 5 7 1 172
3 90.2 20.2 15.6 404.4 11.6 5.1 9.9 21.1
1 1 2 2 1 5 1 102
4 231.0 8.4 4.9 14.2
2 2 3 46
5 13.6 8.7
2 29
6 11.8
13
7 13.2 4.3 6.0 
1 1 15
8 2.7 19.3
1 8
9 9.4
7
10 1.0 
4
11 0.4
2
12 6.7
1
13 6.4 6.7
1 2
14 2.9 1.8
1 3
15 2.3
2
16 6.2
1
The variables domestic1, domestic2, domestic3, domestic4, domestic5, domestic6, domestic7, and domestic8 denote Assassinations, Strikes, 
Guerrilla Activities, Government Crises, Purges, Riots, Revolution, and Antigovernment Demonstrations, respectively.  
Non-italic numbers indicate the amount of ODA par capita received in USD, while italic numbers indicate the number of 
observations for each category.
(R
evo
lua
tio
n）
An
ti-
Go
v D
em
on
str
ati
on
s（
Do
me
sti
c8
）
23
Waseda Global Forum No. 11, 2014, 3－25
Table A3
actotal
PKO
sfi
PKO
domestic 1
PKO
domestic 2
PKO
domestic 3
IKO
domestic 4
PKO
domestic 5
PKO
domestic 6
PKO
domestic 7
IKO
domestic 8
IKO
0 25.5 50.6 6.3 62.6 35.5 62.4 37.0 64.5 37.4 61.0 35.5 59.9 36.8 64.4 33.6 66.0 39.4 66.1 34.3
2,487 90 10 3,617 150 3,674 175 3,482 140 3,631 144 3,884 179 3,455 151 3,296 103 3,218 141
1 24.5 28.6 5.1 20.7 35.3 19.7 21.6 20.4 33.6 38.8 39.5 16.4 21.2 26.5 57.3 27.4 34.0 37.3 44.0
170 12 32 216 15 217 3 452 37 285 35 83 4 294 20 587 69 360 26
2 12.7 55.9 3.6 23.7 61.2 10.6 21.8 19.0 26.8 40.2 44.2 50.5 3.7 22.3 37.2 25.2 24.9 21.3 55.9
144 9 19 66 10 58 4 43 5 63 3 18 1 115 7 92 12 172 6
3 15.8 23.4 9.4 13.3 18.9 19.8 25.0 4.5 39.6 37.8 23.4 5.5 14.3 40.1 8.6 26.9 40.0
135 15 27 32 4 32 1 15 2 10 2 5 53 3 13 107 4
4 7.9 12.7 22.3 14.1 21.2 7.8 784.6 20.5 236.6 18.4 25.2 21.4 24.7
137 9 34 16 1 10 1 4 1 28 2 47 3
5 13.3 37.0 13.8 11.5 15.1 21.8 4.7 13.0 6.2 9.0 
106 13 48 10 1 1 2 13 1 31
6 32.8 92.4 25.1 32.1 50.8 7.2 7.6 11.0 20.7
108 1 68 8 2 2 10 12 1
7 4.3 14.9 23.4 29.1 9.9 4.9 3.8 25.2
39 12 69 1 10 2 14 2
8 1.9 3.6 19.7 268.2 1.4 15.5 32.6
13 2 78 2 3 1 8 1
9 8.1 25.2 29.2 75.6 4.4 1.2 14.9 9.4
23 9 83 4 1 1 4 7
10 3.3 22.6 22.5 41.9 81.9 1.0 1.0 
6 3 103 8 4 1 4
11 0.3 11.8 35.1 39.5 0.2 9.5 0.4
6 2 93 8 1 7 2
12 1.0 27.6 56.9 14.4 20.7 3.8 6.7
9 88 13 3 1 2 1
13 22.0 62.1 50.8 4.3 6.6
86 4 1 2 3
14 22.2 56.7 11.0 0.8 2.1
110 7 1 3 4
15 27.4 59.6 10.4 0.9 2.3
111 17 2 1 1
16 22.5 42.5 5.0 1.9
97 12 1 2
17 22.7 79.2 11.4
87 7 1
18 23.3 14.4
63 7
19 32.6 33.2
42 5
20 38.4 19.9
32 8
21 20.2 25.5
35 5
22 41.8 26.6
38 9
23 11.9 29.0
17 8
24 5.6 6.2
20.0 1
25 26.8
1
26 0.9592
2
Non-italic numbers indicate the amount of ODA received in USD, while italic numbers indicate the number of observations for each 
category.
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Table A4
Dep Var Indep Var Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat
domestic 1 gdp pc -0.001 -2.95 *** -0.001 -2.90 *** 0.000 -2.42 ** 0.000 -2.57 ***
traﬃc 0.000 -1.49 0.000 -1.74 * 0.000 -1.87 * 0.000 -2.00 **
trade 0.369 2.14 ** 0.436 2.40 ** 0.276 1.57 0.319 1.69 *
education 0.013 1.25 0.015 1.35 0.009 0.84 -0.007 -0.48 
politics 0.042 0.22 0.064 0.33 0.018 0.09 0.055 0.27 
odap c -0.035 -6.02 ***
odap c1 lag -0.033 -5.62 ***
odajp c -0.136 -4.52 ***
odajp c1 lag -0.141 -4.27 ***
unp ko 3.076 4.26 *** 3.071 4.19 *** 2.672 3.54 *** 2.645 3.37 ***
africa -3.894 -9.28 *** -4.008 -9.15 *** -4.342 -9.82 *** -4.378 -9.33 ***
N（censored） 2,891 2,567 2,779 2,471 2,756 2,439 2,641 2,344 
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.060 0.055 0.057 
domestic2 gdp pc 0.000 -1.08 0.000 -0.87 0.000 -0.99 0.000 -0.92 
traﬃc 0.000 -0.54 0.000 -0.73 0.000 -0.70 0.000 -0.86 
trade -0.113 -1.2 -0.130 -1.35 -0.178 -1.84 * -0.192 -1.94 *
education -0.006 -0.71 -0.005 -0.55 -0.010 -1.16 -0.009 -1.03 
politics 0.030 0.28 0.039 0.36 -0.011 -0.10 -0.014 -0.13 
odap c -0.015 -5.22 ***
odap c1 lag -0.014 -5.09 ***
odajp c -0.079 -4.35 ***
odajp c1 lag -0.077 -4.22 ***
unp ko -0.628 -1.13 -0.705 -1.27 -0.805 -1.41 -0.825 -1.45 
africa -2.343 -9.06 *** -2.373 -9.08 *** -2.543 -9.43 *** -2.529 -9.37 ***
N（censored） 2,891 2,605 2,779 2,497 2,756 2,477 2,641 2,365 
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.062 0.064 0.063 
domestic 3 gdp pc 0.000 -2.3 ** 0.000 -2.23 ** 0.000 -2.03 ** 0.000 -2.23 **
traﬃc 0.000 -3.37 *** 0.000 -3.46 *** 0.000 -3.50 *** 0.000 -3.61 ***
trade -0.090 -1.87 * -0.091 -1.80 * -0.123 -2.43 ** -0.128 -2.37 **
education 0.002 0.58 0.002 0.65 -0.002 -0.53 -0.011 -2.20 **
politics 0.109 2.04 ** 0.120 2.17 ** 0.101 1.77 * 0.126 2.12 **
odap c -0.014 -7.55 ***
odap c1 lag -0.014 -7.25 ***
odajp c -0.056 -5.39 ***
odajp c1 lag -0.058 -5.06 ***
unp ko 0.737 3.31 *** 0.722 3.21 *** 0.544 2.26 ** 0.651 2.69 ***
africa -0.886 -7.84 *** -0.892 -7.58 *** -1.139 -9.14 *** -1.122 -8.49 ***
N（censored） 2,891 2,431 2,779 2,342 2,756 2,327 2,641 2,239 
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.087 0.077 0.082 
domestic 4 gdp pc 0.000 -2.67 *** 0.000 -2.70 *** 0.000 -2.45 ** 0.000 -2.41 **
（TOBIT）traﬃc 0.000 0.68 0.000 0.35 0.000 0.30 0.000 -0.04 
trade -0.049 -0.7 -0.011 -0.15 -0.054 -0.74 -0.026 -0.34 
education -0.005 -0.82 -0.005 -0.72 -0.005 -0.70 -0.002 -0.36 
politics 0.522 6.66 *** 0.528 6.66 *** 0.542 6.66 *** 0.536 6.56 ***
odap c -0.005 -3.02 ***
odap c1 lag -0.004 -2.46 **
odajp c -0.011 -1.75 *
odajp c1 lag -0.003 -0.59 
unp ko 1.300 4.14 *** 1.299 4.15 *** 1.309 3.98 *** 1.362 4.16 ***
africa -0.906 -5.39 *** -0.876 -5.16 *** -0.986 -5.64 *** -0.901 -5.14 ***
N（censored） 2,891 2,603 2,779 2,500 2,756 2,479 2,641 2,372 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.051 0.053 0.050 
Stars indicate the level of significance（*** １％ , ** ５％ or *10％）． 
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Table A4（continued）
Dep Var Indep Var Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat Coeﬀ t-stat
dometic 5 gdp pc 0.000 -0.01 0.000 0.13 0.000 0.16 0.000 0.40 
traﬃc 0.000 -1.64 0.000 -1.80 * 0.000 -1.64 0.000 -1.73 *
trade -0.207 -1.46 -0.255 -1.67 * -0.265 -1.83 * -0.305 -1.95 *
education 0.014 1.48 0.014 1.37 0.013 1.37 0.028 1.82 *
politics 0.882 5.67 *** 0.851 5.22 *** 0.887 5.67 *** 0.872 5.31 ***
odap c -0.008 -2.04 **
odap c1 lag -0.005 -1.33 
odajp c -0.037 -1.59 
odajp c1 lag -0.012 -0.79 
unp ko -1.657 -1.4 -1.678 -1.38 -1.645 -1.36 -1.615 -1.30 
africa -0.703 -2.24 ** -0.948 -2.76 *** -0.831 -2.57 *** -1.142 -3.16 ***
N（censored） 2,891 2,795 2,779 2,693 2,756 2,662 2,641 2,557 
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.084 0.087 0.091 
dometic 6 gdp pc 0.000 -0.54 0.000 -0.43 0.000 -0.21 0.000 -0.22 
traﬃc 0.000 -2.81 *** -0.001 -2.95 *** 0.000 -2.78 *** 0.000 -2.80 ***
trade -0.246 -1.68 * -0.241 -1.58 -0.362 -2.41 ** -0.354 -2.25 
education -0.011 -0.88 -0.008 -0.59 -0.015 -1.13 -0.013 -0.89 
politics 0.332 2.01 ** 0.360 2.12 ** 0.325 1.93 * 0.355 2.04 
odap c -0.025 -5.95 ***
odap c1 lag -0.026 -5.91 ***
odajp c -0.108 -4.80 ***
odajp c1 lag -0.125 -4.75 ***
unp ko -1.063 -1.26 -1.192 -1.39 -1.272 -1.47 -1.283 -1.45 
africa -2.556 -7.45 *** -2.585 -7.30 *** -2.763 -7.82 *** -2.809 -7.63 ***
N（censored） 2,891 2,463 2,779 2,367 2,756 2,335 2,641 2,238 
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.039 0.036 0.037 
domestic 7 gdp pc 0.000 -3.09 *** 0.000 -3.19 *** 0.000 -3.02 *** 0.000 -3.22 ***
traﬃc 0.000 -1.48 0.000 -1.63 0.000 -1.24 0.000 -1.40 
trade -0.142 -2.88 *** -0.146 -2.85 *** -0.148 -2.81 *** -0.152 -2.76 ***
education 0.003 0.82 0.001 0.38 0.002 0.49 -0.004 -0.86 
politics 0.383 6.99 *** 0.397 7.05 *** 0.399 6.90 *** 0.407 6.82 ***
odap c -0.004 -3.55 ***
odap c1 lag -0.003 -2.76 ***
odajp c -0.023 -3.55 ***
odajp c1 lag -0.025 -3.48 ***
unp ko 1.190 5.09 *** 1.161 4.93 *** 1.096 4.37 *** 1.046 4.10 ***
africa -0.133 -1.23 -0.137 -1.23 -0.255 -2.22 ** -0.218 -1.80 *
N（censored） 2,890 2,303 2,779 2,210 2,755 2,213 2,640 2,118 
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.059 0.056 0.058 
domestic 8 gdp pc 0.000 -0.8 0.000 -0.83 0.000 -0.54 0.000 -0.56 *
traﬃc 0.000 -1.78 * 0.000 -1.98 ** 0.000 -2.08 ** 0.000 -2.27 **
trade -0.185 -1.61 -0.155 -1.32 -0.251 -2.12 ** -0.212 -1.74 *
education -0.010 -0.95 -0.006 -0.54 -0.011 -1.07 -0.006 -0.52 
politics 0.172 1.29 0.165 1.22 
odap c -0.016 -5.71 *** 0.161 1.18 0.157 1.13 
odap c1 lag -0.014 -5.25 ***
odajp c -0.039 -3.78 ***
odajp c1 lag -0.033 -3.28 ***
unp ko -0.612 -0.95 -0.664 -1.03 -0.636 -0.96 -0.563 -0.85 
africa -3.354 -11.8 *** -3.376 -11.71 *** -3.442 -11.83 *** -3.449 -11.63 ***
N（censored） 2,891 2,295 2,779 2,198 2,755 2,169 2,640 2,070 
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.042 0.039 
sfi gdp pc -0.001 -4.71 *** -0.001 -4.52 *** -0.001 -5.01 *** -0.001 -4.95 ***
（OLS） traﬃc 0.000 -3.47 *** 0.000 -3.48 *** 0.000 -2.89 *** 0.000 -2.94 ***
trade -1.194 -7.64 *** -1.206 -7.70 *** -1.195 -7.72 *** -1.186 -7.65 ***
education 0.012 0.94 0.012 0.96 0.009 0.76 0.010 0.80 
politics 0.127 0.62 0.156 0.77 0.077 0.37 0.141 0.69 
odap c -0.018 -2.97 ***
odap c1 lag -0.015 -2.60 ***
odajp c -0.070 -3.19 ***
odajp c1 lag -0.073 -3.24 ***
unp ko 1.039 1.90 * 1.031 1.88 ** 0.630 1.12 0.630 1.11 
africa 2.408 7.40 *** 2.455 7.54 *** 2.154 6.49 *** 2.171 6.57 ***
N 615 615 608 608 
R2（OLS） 0.606 0.610 0.604 0.605 
Stars indicate the level of significance（*** １％ , ** ５％ or * 10％）．
